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My research focuses on the nature of human understanding.

 

Recently, my work draws on thinkers such as Husserl and Heidegger in order to demonstrate the limits of Kant's theory of judgment and understanding; a theory that locates the vehicle of understanding in the representational capacity to combine of concepts into judgment. Overall, I aim to argue for two main theses: (1) the representing by way of judgment that Kant argued allows for understanding in fact marks a derivative or secondary form of understanding, and (2) what enables understanding, including understanding by way of judgment, is a context of understanding. Utilizing Heidegger's work in particular, I have sought to make the case that what enables understanding is a interpretive context that objects to appear in light of our (historically and socially situated) existential self-making. 

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Going forward, I am interested in the sense in which this context of understanding is socially structured, and how the social structure conditions the body. Specifically, my works looks at  Fanon’s criticism of Sartre's phenomenology of the others and how it fails to appreciate the unique way in which the colonialism structures self-understanding and motility.